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# *Looking for answers ...*

*Mariateresa Maggiolino*

# A simple premise, first ...

**In market economies, often law infringements turn into an unfair competitive advantage that infringers enjoy against their rivals**

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graph LR; A["A (dominant) firm that does not comply with environmental law ...  
A (dominant) firm that does not pay taxes ...  
A (dominant) firm that does not obey to safety rules ...  
A (dominant) firm that infringes data protection law ..."] --> B["... benefits from lower costs ..."]; B --> C["... and, hence, may ... enjoy a higher markup, cover up its inefficiencies ... or even make lower prices and devote more resources to develop innovation ... with the ultimate result of increasing consumer welfare but smiting its rivals"]; style A fill:#1f77b4,color:#fff; style B fill:#add8e6,color:#000; style C fill:#add8e6,color:#000;
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- A (dominant) firm that does not comply with environmental law ...
  - A (dominant) firm that does not pay taxes ...
  - A (dominant) firm that does not obey to safety rules ...
  - A (dominant) firm that infringes data protection law ...

... benefits from lower costs ...

... and, hence, may ... enjoy a higher markup, cover up its inefficiencies ... or even make lower prices and devote more resources to develop innovation ... with the ultimate result of **increasing consumer welfare** but **smiting its rivals**

A question, then


Should antitrust law  
intervene to prevent  
dominant firms from  
gaining such unfair  
advantages?



Actually, I believe  
this is not a good  
question for  
lawyers, judges, or  
officers ... at most,  
this could be a  
question for  
legislators, policy  
makers ... and legal  
scholars

# Why?

**For the sake of the rule of law principle,  
antitrust law cannot be applied outside its own boundaries**



If the finding of an infringement requires some conditions to be met, you cannot charge anybody with that infringement if those conditions have not been met

Therefore, the question becomes ...

When does  
current **Art. 102(a)**  
allow prosecuting the  
infringements of  
other pieces of law?



## The Facebook case suggests that ...

A dominant firm that infringes data protection law violates antitrust law as well, if the terms and conditions of its data policy are unfair ...

... that is ... if, in a competitive market, those terms and conditions would not exist, because they:

- unnecessarily limit the freedom of the parties,
- are unjustifiably unrelated to the purpose of the contract,
- are disproportionate,
- are unilaterally imposed or
- are seriously opaque.

**But, the Bundeskartellamt applied another approach:**

**(1) Facebook infringes data protection rules because its users have no control on their data; and**

**(2) such a privacy violation is an abuse, because Facebook is dominant**

# The Bundeskartellamt's approach is questionable for two reasons, at least

## The legal reason (Düsseldorf Court)

1. No 'as if' test was carried out, though art. 102(a) requires it
2. No enough evidence of loss of control – thus, no violation of data protection law
3. Anyway, no connection between such data protection violation and dominance
4. Anyway, *'Dominant undertakings carry a special responsibility only for competition, rather than for compliance with the entire legal system by avoiding any violation of the law'* – G. Colangelo, CPI, 2019



## The policy reason

**Antitrust authorities  
cannot be super-regulators  
presiding over the respect  
of any piece of law**

# Thus, the (tempative) answers to Marco's questions

1. Revival of exploitative abuses?

2. What remedy?

3. Why quashed on appeal?

4. Antitrust and other pieces of law?



1. The Bundeskartellamt did not apply art. 102(a)

2. Proportionate

3. Inconsistent with current law and not well-supported

4. Antitrust law cannot be called to fill the gaps of regulation



Thank you

